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DAMERON V CAPITOL HO USE ASSOCIATES
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP: PROTECTIVE
ORDERS TO PROVIDE RENT
COLLECTION, LOOPHOLE
FOR LANDLORDS?
Since 1970, the courts of the District of Columbia have used protective
orders' in landlord-tenant disputes for the dual purposes of protecting
landlords from losing rent that accrues during litigation2 and safeguarding
tenants from eviction for nonpayment of rent at the conclusion of the suit.'
This procedural device requires tenants to pay rent into the court registry
as it comes due during a suit for repossession of the landlord's premises
where tenants assert a defense, pursue an appeal, or request a jury trial.4
The escrow fund that results from such rental deposits is disbursed at the
conclusion of the suit, according to the determination of the trial court.5 If
housing code violations are found, rental charges for the litigation period
are abated accordingly, with the tenant receiving the difference. 6 Abate-
1. The use of protective orders in landlord-tenant disputes in the District of Columbia
was initiated through judicial adoption of the device in Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430
F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Several states have since followed suit. See, e.g., Green v. Supe-
rior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rpt. 704 (1974) and Teller v. McCoy, 253
S.E.2d 114 (W.Va. 1978). Other states have incorporated the use of escrow accounts main-
tained under court control through their statutory scheme to preserve rent during landlord-
tenant litigation. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.645 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980) and
OR. REV. STAT. § 91.810 (1979).
The use of the term protective order appears to be unique to the District of Columbia in
describing its rent preservation device. Other jurisdictions refer to deposits in court. In its
more common usage, the term protective order is used to describe an order designed to
prevent the abuse of discovery.
2. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3. See McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 512 (D.C. 1975). The court of appeals also
commented on the potential effects of rent withholding on other tenants of an apartment
complex. The court noted that the loss of rent from a tenant may prevent the landlord from
making needed repairs or lead to a rent increase for the other tenants in order for the land-
lord to offset the loss of income. Id.
4. See Cooks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d 1269, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bell v. Tsintolas Realty
Co., 430 F.2d at 481.
5. See Bell, 430 F.2d at 485. A few jurisdictions permit release of a portion of the rent
deposited in escrow to the landlord for the purpose of remedying substandard conditions.
See, e.g., Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973), Fritz
v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.530(4)
& 125.535(4) (1976), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.07 & 1923.061(8) (Page 1981).
6. See Bell, 430 F.2d at 485.
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ment is also appropriate if either party amends his complaint or answer to
allege a change in the condition of the premises during the litigation.7 If
the tenant abandons the premises prior to trial, any money deposited in the
court registry must be apportioned between the landlord and the tenant
following a hearing to determine the rights of the parties.'
The tenant's most effective tactic in a landlord-tenant controversy is the
withholding of rent.9 Deposit of rent into the court registry promotes the
utility of this tactic, while assuring the landlord of the recovery of rent if he
prevails. By withholding rent, the tenant subjects the landlord to financial
pressure that might force settlement of the dispute.' Traditionally, the
courts in the District of Columbia have encouraged this tactic by refusing
to release funds from the court registry until a final determination of the
rights of both parties has been made. "
Recently, however, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Dam-
eron v. Capitol House Associates Limited Partnership, 2 permitted the re-
lease of funds deposited in the court registry to the landlord during the
litigation. This decision may signal the initiation of more sympathetic
7. See id
8. See McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 514 n.15 (D.C. 1975).
9. The tenant tactic of rent withholding received impetus in Chicago in 1961, as a
weapon against slumlords. When the Cook County Department of Public Aid found itself
inadvertently subsidizing a substantial number of slum dwellings, it withheld rent payments.
Withholding Rent: a new weapon added to arsenalfor war on slumlords, 21 J. OF HOUSING 64,
67 (1964).
4 Model Housing Law, proposed by Lawrence Veiller in 1914, contained a provision for
rent withholding if the rental unit did not comply with the health codes. This rent withhold-
ing provision was retained by very few cities and states that adopted Veiller's Model Hous-
ing Law proposal. Even when retained, the provision for rent withholding proved largely
ineffective since it applied only to buildings constructed after adoption of the provision. Id
at 68.
Recent discussions of rent withholding have reiterated that its main purpose is to give the
tenant power to put pressure on the landlord to restore substandard housing and deter its
further degeneration. See, e.g., Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969); King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1973); 176 E. 123 St. Corp. v. Flores, 65 Misc.2d 130, 317
N.Y.S.2d 150 (1970); DePaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971); Teller v. Mc-
Coy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.3 (1977).
Cf Comment, Rent Withholding Won't Work: The Need For a Realistic Rehabilitation Policy,
7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 66 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability. A New Doctrine Raising
New Issues,, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1479-80, 1482-85 (1974); Note, The Great Green Hope.
The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 729, 770 n.206 (1976).
11. In the District of Columbia, specific requests for direct payment to the landlord, as
well as requests for disbursement of funds in the escrow account to the landlord during
litigation, have been rejected both before and after a protective order procedure was
adopted. See Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669, 676 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Dorfmann v. Boozer,
414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
12. 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981).
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treatment of the landlord by the District of Columbia courts in landlord-
tenant disputes.
In Dameron, the District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Office' 3
authorized a rent increase for the landlord, Capitol House Associates.'
4
When the increase became effective, some of the tenants continued to pay
the former rental amount. Capitol House Associates filed suit for posses-
sion of those tenants' units based on their nonpayment of rent.'5 Following
the tenants' request for a jury trial, Capitol House Associates filed a mo-
tion for a protective order to require the tenants to pay the full monthly
rent into the court registry and to release the original rental amount to
Capitol House Associates during the lawsuit.' 6 The trial judge entered the
protective order as requested, over the tenants' objections. 7 On appeal, the
court of appeals held that a pretrial protective order is not appealable and
that this order was properly framed.' 8
This Note will examine the historical development of protective orders
in landlord-tenant disputes in the District of Columbia. It will analyze the
court's decision in Dameron and demonstrate that its application should be
limited to the narrow circumstances of the case. Finally, this Note will
comment on the potential of the Dameron decision to weaken the effective-
ness of rent withholding by tenants in a landlord-tenant dispute.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The use of protective orders in landlord-tenant disputes developed in
conjunction with the adoption of the doctrine of implied warranty of hab-
itability'9 for leases of urban dwellings.2° This doctrine was enunciated for
13. The District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Office was established pursuant
to the Rent Control Act of 1973. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1622(a)-1623(a) (1973) (amended
1981). The Rental Accommodations Office regulated rents and authorized increases or de-
creases in rent based on an established formula. Before authorizing an increase, the Rental
Accommodations Office was required to consider the hardship placed on the tenants. D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-1644-1649 (Supp. IV 1975), §§ 45-1688-1693 (Supp. VII 1980) (amended
1981). The Rental Accommodations Office was abolished by D.C. Law 3-131 and replaced
by the Rental Housing Commission on March 4, 1981. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1511-1512
(1981).
14. 431 A.2d at 581.
15. Id at 582.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. Id. at 584.
19. Courts had earlier read implied warranties of fitness into the sale of newly con-
structed homes. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Implied warranties of habitability
1982]
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the first time in the District of Columbia in Javins v. First National Realty
Corp. 21 In Javins, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed a District of Columbia appellate court decision
that prohibited tenants from asserting housing code violations as a defense
to an action for eviction based on nonpayment of rent.22 The court held
that a warranty of habitability is implied for all dwellings covered by the
Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia. 23 In adopting this im-
plied warranty, the court stated that the common law rule relieving the
landlord of any burden of maintaining rental units was inconsistent with
the housing code and the nature of modem housing.24 It held that the
landlord's breach of the implied warranty gives rise to all the remedies
available for breach of contract 25 and that the tenant's obligation to pay
rent depends on the landlord's performance of his obligations to maintain
were also being read into leases of furnished dwellings. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 23 Utah
2d 257, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 509, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
20. Adoption of the implied warranty of habitability through statute or court decision
has not solved the problem of substandard housing for the urban dweller that it was
designed to address. See Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An
Integration, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1976); Chused, Contemporary Dilemmas of the davins Defense:
A Note on the Needfor Procedural Reform in Landlord-Tenant Law, 67 GEO. L.J. 1385
(1979).
21. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). While routinely adopt-
ing an implied warranty for residential property, courts generally refuse to extend its protec-
tion to commercial leases. See Cameron v. Calhoun-Smith Dist. Co., 442 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969).
22. In reaching its decision, the court considered the acute housing shortage in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the inequality of bargaining power between the landlord and the tenant,
the growth in consumer protection law, and the tenant's interest in securing decent housing.
428 F.2d at 1072, 1076-77.
23. Id at 1072-73.
24. Id at 1076-77. The court indicated that the common law rule was based on the
realities of an agrarian, not an urban., society. Such realities had little application to the
situation faced by the modern apartment dweller. While a member of an agrarian society
generally had an interest in the land, the modern apartment dweller is more concerned with
decent housing. Id at 1077-79. The city dweller's search for adequate housing becomes
more difficult in a tight rental market. The rental housing shortage in the District of Colum-
bia has been a continuing problem. In 1975, the Committee on Housing and Community
Development of the District of Columbia found that the rental vacancy rate was only 2.7%.
This rate is sufficiently low to constitute an emergency under Department of Housing and
Urban Development guidelines. The Committee further noted that the supply of low and
moderate income rental housing was continuing to decrease, and indications pointed to a
continuation of that trend. Hearings and Disposition Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Housing, and Transportation of the Comm. on the District of Columbia: First Session on H.
Con. Res. 399 to Disapprove the District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Act of 1975,
reprinted in I COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MISCELLANEOUS HEARINGS, 94TH
CONG., IST SESS. (1975). See infira note 127.
25. 428 F.2d at 1082 n.61.
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the premises in a habitable condition.26
During the dispute, the tenants in Javins offered to pay their rent into
the registry of the court as it came due.27 The court accepted this offer and
further suggested that such a procedure would be appropriate whenever
tenants in possession seek to defend against an eviction action for nonpay-
ment of rent by alleging that the landlord breached the implied warranty
of habitability.2 The court stated that the money in the court registry
should be apportioned on the basis of the actual rental value of the prem-
ises as determined at trial. 29 Finally, if either party alleges any change in
the condition of the premises during the trial, the later disbursement of
money in escrow should accordingly be apportioned with respect to this
change.30
II. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USE OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS
A. Pretrial Protective Orders
Five weeks after Javins, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, in Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 3 1 formally
adopted a protective order procedure for establishing a rental escrow fund
in the court registry during litigation of landlord-tenant controversies. In
Bell, the tenants asserted a Javins defense in response to the landlords'
action for eviction based on nonpayment of rent.32 The landlords filed a
motion for an order requiring the tenants to deposit their rent into the
court registry as it came due.33 The trial court granted the motion,34 and
the tenants sought a stay of the order in the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.35
26. Id. at 1082.
27. Id. at 1083 n. 67.
28. Id
29. Id. The court stated that "[als a general rule, the escrowed money should be appor-
tioned between the landlord and the tenant after trial on the basis of the finding of rent
actually due for the period at issue in the suit." Id
30. Id
31. 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Bell, the court had consolidated several cases
involving nonpayment of rent in which the landlords had sought protective orders to require
the tenants to deposit their rent into the court registry as it came due. Id at 478-79.
32. Id at 477 n.3. The landlords in the District of Columbia had had two options when
seeking repossession of rental units due to the tenants refusal to pay the stipulated rent. They
could enter a complaint for summary possession or a complaint for possession and the rent
in arrears. See id at 477 n.5. In a suit for summary possession, the tenant is not permitted to
enter any defense other than his payment of the rent.
33. Id at 478.
34. Id
35. Id at 478-79.
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The appellate court first considered the rationale for imposing or re-
jecting the protective order sought by the landlords. It noted that the issu-
ance of such a protective order is an extraordinary variation from judicial
tradition.36 Ordinarily, a plaintiff has no guarantee that a defendant will
have sufficient funds to cover any judgment rendered against him. The
court was wary of upsetting the balance of tactics in landlord-tenant cases
in favor of landlords by initiating a rent collection procedure, 37 and sug-
gested that requiring an indigent tenant to pay rent into the court registry
in order to assert a defense might restrict that tenant's access to the legal
system.38
The court recognized, however, that the landlord was now exposed to
increased risk of loss since the summary nature of a suit for possession had
been altered to permit the tenant to assert defenses and request a jury
trial.39 The potentially protracted litigation could deprive the landlord of
36. Id at 479-81. The court recognized that pre-judgment attachment is sparingly used
in the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-501 (1981) requires the plaintiff to show
that the defendant is about to evade service of process or to transfer the contested property
out of the court's jurisdiction. In addition, the plaintiff is required to post a bond double the
amount of his claim. Id § 16-501(e).
37. 430 F.2d at 480-81. The court stated: "We have previously viewed the struggle be-
tween tenants and landlords as involving 'a variety of closely balanced legal and tactical
approaches' and have been wary of tipping that balance in favor of the landlord by authoriz-
ing a rent collection procedure outside the scope of the 'panoply of legal remedies' provided
him by the District of Columbia Code." Id
Additionally, the court relied on Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In
Dorfmann, the tenants had formed an organization to deal with the landlord about matters
concerning their tenancy. Alleging housing code violations, the tenants withheld their rent
and paid it into a bank account opened by their tenant organization. The landlord sought an
injunction to compel the organization to turn the funds over to him. The trial court, finding
that the landlord was without operating funds, had a monthly deficit of $23,000, and had a
loan in default thereby facing imminent foreclosure, granted the injunction. On the tenants'
appeal, the court of appeals reversed, recognizing that there is statutory provision for attach-
ment prior to judgment in landlord and tenant actions. Id at 1171. Further, the court noted
that alleviating the financial hardship of the landlord by turning over the tenants' funds
places the tenants at risk. Id at 1173. Since the landlord put up no bond, if the tenants
eventually prevail on the merits of their defense, they will be unable to recover their funds
should the landlord subsequently become insolvent. Id
38. 430 F.2d at 479-81. While the court, in Bell, expressed concern that requiring a
tenant to pay rent into the court registry may indirectly inhibit access to the courts of indi-
gent tenants, the United States Supreme Court, in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972),
upheld an Oregon statute requiring rental payment during the period of litigation.
39. Bell, 430 F.2d at 481-82. Rule 6 of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
Landlord and Tenant Rules, gave the tenant the right to request a jury trial upon timely
demand. In Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), the United States Supreme
Court held that a tenant was entitled, by virtue of the seventh amendment, to a jury trial of a
suit brought by a landlord for possession. See also supra note 32.
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income from the premises for months.40 This would be particularly unfair
where the landlord ultimately prevails, but the tenant does not have suffi-
cient resources to pay the judgment.41 Secondly, the court noted that a
protective order requires the tenant to deposit rent only as it comes due, an
obligation the tenant should find "neither heavy nor unexpected.
42
After considering the equities, 43 the court concluded that the payment of
rent into the court registry is an appropriate compromise of both parties'
interests.44 The use of a protective order enables the tenants to exert pres-
sure on the landlord to resolve the conflict while assuring the landlord that
he will eventually receive the amount of rent to which he is entitled.
The court then examined the procedure under which protective orders
should be applied in landlord-tenant disputes. The court authorized their
issuance but did not favor their indiscriminate use.45 It required that such
protective orders be issued on a case-by-case basis and only when the ten-
ant has either asserted a defense or requested a jury trial.46 Furthermore,
the landlord must file a motion for a protective order and serve notice of
that motion on the tenants. The court will then hold a hearing at which the
tenants may argue against the motion, while the landlord must adequately
demonstrate an obvious need for the protective order.47
The court noted, however, that the landlord's need alone is not a suffi-
cient basis on which to issue the order. The trial judge must also consider
the merits of the tenant's defense, the extent of any housing code viola-
tions, and any response of the landlord if he was notified of the defects.48
40. For example, in Dameron, the suit had continued for 14 months without resolution.
41. 430 F.2d at 482.
42. Id.
43. Id The court stated that a protective order is "an equitable remedy to avoid placing
one party at severe disadvantage during the period of litigation." Id
44. Id
45. Id at 479. The court explicitly stated that "such prepayment is not favored and
should be ordered only in limited circumstances." Id The use of protective orders at both
the pretrial and appellate stage of litigation in landlord-tenant controversies, however, has
become the norm rather than the exception. Thousands of such orders are entered annually.
See, e.g., Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1981); Morrissette Real
Estate v. Hunt, 109 D. Wash. L. Rep. 901, 904 (Super. Ct. D.C.) April 8, 1981. See also
Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
46. Bell, 430 F.2d at 483.
47. Id at 483-84. Among the factors a trial judge may consider in determining whether
the landlord's need for a protective order exists are the amount of rent alleged to be due, the
number of months the landlord has not received even a partial payment, the reasonableness
of the rent, the amount of the landlord's monthly obligations for the premises, whether the
tenant has been allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, and whether the landlord faces a
substantial threat of foreclosure. Id at 484.
48. Id
19821
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In addition, if the trial judge determines that the tenant has made a strong
showing of housing code violations or has spent a portion of the rent due
on repairs of the premises, he may order that a proportionately decreased
amount be paid into the court registry rather than the original contract
rate.49 Finally, the court stated that the funds in the escrow account should
be disbursed at the conclusion of the trial, according to the trial court's
determination as to the proper amount to which each party is entitled.5"
B. Protective Orders in the Appellate Process
In Cooks v. Fowler,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit confronted the role of the protective order in the ap-
pellate process. In Cooks, the landlord was a seventy-nine year old widow
who sought possession of her rental unit when the tenant failed to pay the
rent due. She claimed that she was dependent on the rental income 52 and
alleged that the operating deficit on the building had reached $3,500 and
was still mounting.53 When judgment was entered for the landlord, the
tenant sought a stay of eviction pending appeal. 4 The trial court granted a
stay, subject to a protective order requiring the tenant to pay the full
monthly rent into the court registry as it came due.55 The tenant chal-
lenged this order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.56
49. Id at 484-85. Later decisions have indicated that, while a tenant may be entitled to
pay a reduced rent, a tenant is not entitled to live rent free, except for the period of time the
court determined housing code violations were so major as to call for a full set-off. See, e.g.,
Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1981) (landlord given possession
of premises for tenant's failure to comply with protective order); Morrissette Real Estate v.
Hunt, 109 D. Wash. L. Rep. 901 (Super. Ct. D.C.) April 8, 1981 (landlord sought to strike
tenant's pleadings for her failure to comply with a protective order. The tenant's inability to
pay is not a defense to a possessory action. The tenant may pursue her contractual rights in
another forum).
50. 430 F.2d at 485. Accordingly, the trial court may determine that no substantial
housing code violations exist, entitling the landlord to the full rent, or that the violations are
so severe that the tenant's obligation to pay rent is nullified, or that some portion of rent is
owed to the landlord with the tenant receiving the difference. Id
51. 437 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 197 1). At the outset, the tenant challenged the granting of a
stay of eviction conditioned on compliance with a protective order pending appeal. This
condition was upheld by the court. 437 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The trial court subse-
quently required payment of the full rental amount although the premises were in violation
of the housing code. The tenant then appealed the amount required to be deposited pursu-
ant to the protective order. 459 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52. Id at 674 n.25.
53. Id





Addressing the rationale for requiring a protective order pending appeal
in landlord-tenant disputes, the court noted that, unlike a pretrial order, an
order requiring the posting of security pending appeal is not unusual."
Furthermore, equity requires that the court carefully consider the parties'
positions and avoid placing either at a disadvantage during further litiga-
tion.i As in Bell, the court noted that the tenant is only being asked to
fulfill an obligation that he voluntarily assumed by entering into a lease.59
However, as with pretrial protective orders, the court did not intend to
make protective orders automatically available in the appellate process.60
The court emphasized that the landlord must still show a need for such an
order at the appellate stage.61
The court next established the appropriate procedure for issuing a pro-
tective order in the appellate stage of a landlord-tenant dispute. It held
that the Bell standards must be complied with before an order can be is-
sued.62 In addition, the amount to be deposited monthly pursuant to the
protective order must be related to the findings of the trial court.63 Thus,
where housing code violations have been found, the rent must be abated in
accordance with these findings.
C. Hearing Requirementfor Protective Orders
In both Bell and Cooks, the court of appeals required a motion, notice,
and an evidentiary hearing prior to issuing a protective order in a land-
57. Cooks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d 1269, 1271-73 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The most frequently used
security device pending appeal is the supersedeas bond. In the District of Columbia, the
party appealing from the judgment is required to post a bond to stay execution of the judg-
ment pending appeal. See Super. Ct. R. Civ. 62(d); D.C. Ct. App. R. 7.
58. 459 F.2d at 1273. The court noted that the equitable balancing may "eventuate in a
stay of eviction for the tenant and a protective order for the landlord." Id at 1273 n.27.
59. Id at 1273.
60. Id at 1272. The court repeated the admonition in Bell that "if the landlord has been
accorded a summary judgment. . . or other judgment on the merits, the case for requiring
prepayment of rent is strengthened" while "if the tenant prevails at the trial level, any pre-
payment order will be discontinued." Id at 1272-73.
61. Id at 1273. In Cooks, the need for a protective order was demonstrated to the trial
court's satisfaction by evidence of the landlord's financial situation. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 51-55. The court of appeals further noted, however, the inconsistency of this
asserted need and the landlord's asserted plan to remove the tenant's unit from the rental
market. The court directed the trial court to resolve the inconsistency on remand. 459 F.2d at
1275 n.53.
62. Id at 1275. In Bell, the court required motion by the landlord, notice of the motion
served on the tenant, and an opportunity for a hearing before issuing a protective order. 430
F.2d at 483-84.
63. 459 F.2d at 1274-75. Anticipating the difficulty of determinig the fair rental value of
premises that violate the housing code, the court of appeals recognized that "the size of the
security deposits need be, and usually can be, only an informed estimate." Id at 1275.
1982]
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lord-tenant dispute. In McNeal v. Habib,' the court addressed the issue of
whether a landlord's oral motion for a protective order entered at trial with
both parties present satisfied these procedural requirements. 65 Addition-
ally, the court determined whether disbursement of funds without a hear-
ing satisfies the Bell requirement that the disposition be made by the court
at the conclusion of the trial, following a presentation of evidence by both
parties.66
In McNeal, the landlord made an oral motion for a protective order
requiring the tenant to pay the monthly rent into the court registry when
the tenant asserted a Javins defense to his suit for repossession of the rental
property.67 After oral argument, the motion was granted, and the tenant
complied with the order by depositing one month's rent into the court reg-
istry. The tenant surrendered possession of the premises before the trial
date, however, and sought to have the money that he had deposited in the
court registry returned. 68 The trial judge nevertheless released the money
to the landlord without a hearing.69
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the pro-
tective order but reversed the lower court's disbursement of the escrow
account. The court recognized that the landlord is unaware of any need to
seek a protective order until the original trial date, since it is at that point
that the tenant asserts a defense or requests a jury trial.71 Where both par-
ties are present, the Bell procedural requirements are satisfied, provided
the tenant is given an adequate opportunity to present evidence of any
housing code violations that may abate the amount to be deposited
64. 346 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1975). With the enactment of the District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, the District of Columbia court system was
reorganized. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, rather than the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, became the final arbiter of appeals
from final judgments and orders of the Superior Court. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473
(1970) (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-721 (1981).
65. Id at 510-11.
66. Id See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
67. 346 A.2d at 510.
68. Id The tenant argued that Bell had held that, when a tenant abandons the premises
prior to trial, he is entitled to any money that he had deposited in the court registry pursuant
to a protective order, unless the landlord promptly seeks a money judgment. In the alterna-
tive, the tenant sought a hearing on abatement under Javins. Id at 510-11.
69. Id at 511.
70. Id Of the approximately 120,000 cases handled annually by the Landlord and Ten-
ant Branch of the District of Columbia Superior Court by 1975, few actually went to trial.
Most cases were concluded on the trial date by dismissal, default, or judgment by confes-
sion. Id See also Gerwin, A Study ofthe Evolution and Potential ofLandlord-Tenant Law and
Judicial Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the District of Columbia-Part I1: A Critical Ex-
amination and Provosal/or Re/orm, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 641, 657-58 (1977). But see supra
note 45. (Thousands of protective orders are entered annually in the District of Columbia.)
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monthly in the court registry pursuant to a protective order.7 However,
the court held that in the absence of an agreement by the parties,7 2 when a
tenant has alleged that housing code violations exist, a hearing must be
held to determine if the tenant is entitled to a set-off on his rent.73 That
hearing requirement may be satisfied within the context of the trial, but
where, as in McNeal, no trial ensues, a hearing for disbursement of funds
must be scheduled.74
In Armwood v. RentalAssociates, Inc. ," the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals underscored the necessity of an evidentiary hearing prior to
disbursement of an escrow fund established pursuant to a protective order
in a landlord-tenant controversy. In this case, the trial judge, without hold-
ing an evidentiary hearing, released the funds the tenant had deposited in
the court registry after a settlement agreement between the landlord and
the tenant had lapsed.76 Consequently, the tenant was prevented from of-
fering evidence as to the reasonable rental value of the premises prior to
their repair by the landlord.77
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. 78 Relying on
Javins and McNeal, the court of appeals affirmed the tenant's right to pres-
ent evidence as to abatement of rent based on the condition of the premises
during the period when the protective order was in effect.79 Thus, the court
remanded the case for a hearing to determine the reasonable rental value
of the apartment during the time the repairs were incomplete.80
71. McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d at 511-12.
72. Id at 515 n.16. The court stated that "[i]f opposing counsel formally agree on the
disbursement of the money, we see no need for a judicial order to obtain a release of the
escrowed funds." Id
73. Id at 514. The court in McNeal indicated that the Bell court's suggestion to return
deposited funds to the tenant if the tenant abandons the premises prior to trial was dicta, in
the nature of an advisory opinion, and need not be followed as precedent since that issue
was not present in Bell. Id at 514 n. 15. The court in McNeal decided that since both "parties
and the money already are before the court, it would be pointless to call for instituting a new
proceeding as a means of concluding the existing one." Id
74. Id at 514. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1402 (1981) provides that "[a] tenancy from month
to month, or from quarter to quarter, may be terminated by a 30 days notice in writing from
the landlord to the tenant to quit .... " Since housing code violations are not relevant to
the statutory notice to quit, the court is to determine if an abated rent is appropriate only for
the time the tenant was in possession beyond the notice period. In arriving at its determina-
tion, the court should also consider the effect of the tenant's continued occupancy on the
landlord's ability to put his property to productive use. Id
75. 429 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1981).
76. Id at 191.
77. Id.
78. Id at 190.
79. Id at 191.
80. Id
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III. RELEASE OF ESCROWED FUNDS TO THE LANDLORD
DURING THE LITIGATION
In addition to holding steadfastly to the requirement of a hearing before
funds in a tenant's escrow account may be disbursed, the court of appeals
has been just as adamant in its insistence that no funds be disbursed until
the lawsuit is concluded. As well as filing a motion for a protective order,
the elderly landlord in Cooks also filed a motion to require the tenant to
pay the monthly rent directly to her, rather than depositing it in the court
registry.81 The court denied the request, stating that the landlord had
failed to demonstrate a compelling need for the release of the funds.8 2 It
noted that the tenant risks irreparable injury if, following a release of
funds in escrow during the lawsuit, the landlord becomes insolvent and is
unable to return to the tenant the abatement determined by the court. 3
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia recommended a very cautious approach to any request for a re-
lease of funds during litigation. In dicta, the court recognized that
extraordinary circumstances might justify releasing some portion of the
funds in the court registry.84 However, it stated that only that part of the
funds over which there is no dispute and to which the landlord will neces-
sarily be entitled at the end of the litigation should be released.85 The
court further required that any claim by the tenant that he is not liable for
the full rental amount for the premises must be honored so long as the
claim is not frivolous,86 thereby suggestingthat the tenant must concede
that a particular portion of the rent is presenTly due and will continue to be
due to the landlord.
Finally, the court specified that a landlord's claim to a portion of the
money deposited in the court registry must receive the most careful scru-
tiny by the trial court at a hearing of which the tenant has received no-
tice.87 The landlord must then "demonstrate convincingly so dire a
81. Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d at 676 n.39.
82. Id
83. Id The court indicated that "[tihe landlord's protective order, like the injunction, is
'an equitable remedy,' (citation omitted) and is similarly circumscribed." Id In determining
whether an injunction should issue, the court must be convinced "that the normal legal
avenues are inadequate, that there is a compelling need to give the plaintiff the relief he
seeks, and that the injunction will not wreak greater harm on the party enjoined." Dorfmann
v. Boozer, 414 F.2d at 1174. These criteria thus apply to the issuance of an order releasing
funds in escrow during litigation. 437 F.2d at 676 n.39.
84. Cooks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d at 1277. The court maintained that its "basic responsibil-
ity to do equity between the parties leaves a small, sharply circumscribed area in which a
turnover of some part of the fund might be vindicated." fd





need""8 for interim relief that the court is persuaded to grant it. This lan-
guage strongly indicates that the landlord must show a much greater need
to obtain a release of escrow funds during litigation than is necessary to
obtain the initial protective order.
IV. THE DAMERON SOLUTION-SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
Through its decision in Dameron, the court of appeals raised doubts as
to its continued commitment to preserving the entire fund in the court reg-
istry until the conclusion of a landlord-tenant suit. The dispute in Dam-
eron arose when the District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Office
authorized a rent increase in December that was to take effect the follow-
ing February. 9 The tenants petitioned the Rent Administrator for a re-
view of the increase but were notified that the increase would become
effective immediately and would not be stayed pending review.9°
To protest the increase, approximately half of the tenants in the apart-
ment tendered their February and March rent at the original rate.9 ' Capi-
tol House Associates sued for possession of those tenants' units based on
their nonpayment of rent.92 The tenants requested a jury trial, and imme-
diately, Capitol House Associates filed a motion for a protective order that
would require the tenants to pay the full monthly rent into the court regis-
try during the litigation and the court to release the original rental amount
to them monthly.
93
At the hearing on the landlord's motion, the tenants indicated that they
intended to raise housing code violations as a defense and sought preserva-
88. In Cooks, the court stated that the imposition of any equitable remedy should pre-
vent either party from being placed in a position of disadvantage during the litigation. 459
F.2d at 1273. In addition, the court relied heavily on the Bell rationale. One of the concerns
of the Bell court was not to unbalance tactics in favor of landlords. 430 F.2d at 480-81. See
supra note 37.
89. 431 A.2d at 581-82. In addition to the 20% increase to take effect in February, a
further 10% increase was authorized from July 1. Brief for Appellee at 1, Dameron, 431 A.2d
580 (D.C. 1981).
90. Brief for Appellee at 1, Dameron, 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981). Tenants may challenge
a rent increase by filing a petition with the Rent Administrator. The Rent Administrator
makes a final decision regarding the rent increase within 120 days of the filing of the peti-
tion. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1517(e), 45-1527 (1981). Within 10 days of the Rent Adminis-
trator's decision, the party aggrieved by it may appeal that decision to the three member
Rental Housing Commission. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1512(e), 45-1527(g) (1981). The Com-
mission's decision on the appeal must be issued within 30 days of its filing. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 45-152 7(g) (1981). In turn, persons aggrieved by the Commission's decision may seek re-
view in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1530 (1981).
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tion of the entire fund in the court registry.94 They alleged that housing
code violations existed in the apartment building, and that the entire fund
formed part of the dispute since they were contesting the validity of the
rent increase.95 They further claimed that, under Cooks, they were entitled
to a full hearing to determine the landlord's right to the funds before the
conclusion of the suit.
9 6
In seeking the release of a substantial portion of the escrow funds, the
landlord argued that the court was obligated to balance his need for secur-
ing money for mortgage payments and operating expenses against the ten-
ants' interest in maintaining control over the funds.97 He further
maintained that a release was proper without a full hearing so long as the
tenants eventually have an opportunity to present their abatement
claims.
98
District of Columbia Superior Court Judge Frederick Weisberg rejected
the tenants' arguments and granted the protective order.99 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the decision of the trial
court. 100
On appeal, the tenants challenged the release of the funds to the land-
lord during litigation. The court of appeals, however, raised the issue of
the appealability of pretrial protective orders sua sponte.'O' The court
noted that a pretrial protective order is not final, since it may be revised at
any point during the suit."°2 Accordingly, the court held that it was not
appealable under the laws of the District of Columbia.° 3
Next, the court examined the exceptions to the final judgment rule in
order to determine if the pretrial order was appealable. It held that the
protective order was not subject to review under either the collateral order
94. Id
95. Brief for Appellants at 4, 6, Dameron, 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981). If the rent increase
was invalidated, abatement for housing code violations would be due from the original rent
since the entire amount of increase would be returned to the tenants.
96. Id at 6, 7, Dameron, 431 A.2d at 582.
97. Brief for Appellee at 7, Dameron, 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981). The rent Capitol House
Associates had received, however, had left it unable to cover the building's expenses for
years. Id at 14. This brings into question the Cooks' requirement of a showing of potential
solvency at the conclusion of the litigation as well as dire need.
98. Brief for Appellee at 9, Dameron, 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981).
99. Dameron, 431 A.2d at 582.
100. Id at 584.
101. Id at 582.
102. Id at 585. In Blanks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court stated that
"protective orders are subject to reopening and revision for good cause at any time." Id at
1284 n. 13.
103. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-721(a)(1) (1981) gives the court jurisdiction over "all final
orders and judgments of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia."
[Vol. 31:615
Protective Orders
doctrine or the interlocutory exception."0 The collateral order doctrine al-
lows review of procedural matters not directly related to the substance of
the dispute, especially where they may foreclose a party's access to the
court. °5 In Dameron, the validity of protective orders was not disputed;
only the amount to be deposited in the court registry pursuant to the pro-
tective order was in controversy. Judicial practice vests the determination
of this amount in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the tenants in
Dameron were not 'foreclosed from access to the courts by imposition of
the protective order."° Therefore, the order was not appealable as a collat-
eral order.107 Discussing the statutory interlocutory order exception, 0 8 the
court stated that, for an order to be appealable under this statute, it must
affect real property and alter the status quo between the parties.'0 9 Since
the order in Dameron affects money and does not alter the status quo, it is
not appealable." 0
In determining the propriety of this protective order, the court of ap-
peals reviewed the purposes served by protective orders.I" It noted that
the significant factor in this dispute was a rent increase. The court stated
that the housing code violations demonstrated at the hearing during which
the protective order was entered were de minimis, and thus concluded that
a protective order with a provision for release of funds to the landlord
during litigation sufficiently protected both parties' interests." 12 According
to the court, to refuse to release funds in this case would permit the protec-
tive order to become an "economic weapon of unreasonable
104. Dameron, 431 A.2d at 586-87. Appeal from a pretrial protective order may still be
possible, however, where both gross abuse of discretion and irreparable injury can be shown.
Id. at 584 n.6.
105. Id at 586-87. The collateral order doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). This doctrine allows appeal
from an order that is final and unrelated to the merits but may result in irreparable injury if
not appealed immediately.
106. 431 A.2d at 586-87.
107. Id at 586. But see Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d at 672 n.7. The court stated that
"[w]ith some regularity we have considered pretrial protective orders appealable ... and we
perceive no basis for distinguishing protective orders framed with a view to a prospective
appeal. Both types seem to fall within the collateral order doctrine articulated in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)." Id
1'08. D.C. CODE AKN. § 11-721(a)(2)(C) (1981) provides that "[t]he District of Columbia
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia changing or affecting the possession of property."
109. Dameron, 431 A.2d at 587.
110. Id.
111. Id at 584. The court noted that protective orders preserve rent, provide a source of
abatement, and assure that the tenant is asserting his defense in good faith. Id
112. Id
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proportion."' 1 3
Considering the tenants' request for an evidentiary hearing, the court
asserted that a full hearing on a release of a portion of the funds held in
the court registry is inappropriate at the pretrial stage because the order
does not affect any permanent property rights of the parties. It further
noted that a full hearing has the potential of denying the parties the right
to a jury trial by preempting the dispute.' 14 Finally, the court stated that a
protective order should be designed to preserve the status quo, and this
was precisely the effect of the protective order in Dameron."5
V. DAMERON: TURNOVER OR TURNABOUT?
Until its decision in Dameron, the court of appeals had been extremely
wary of sanctioning any arrangement that would result in a release of
funds deposited by tenants in the court registry during the litigation of a
landlord-tenant controversy, i16 In Cooks, the court required a landlord to
demonstrate both severe need and financial solvency when seeking a re-
lease of funds during litigation." 7 It is doubtful that the landlord in Dam-
eron met these apparently incompatible burdens. " 8 In Cooks, the
landlord's inability to meet expenses for several years while receiving rent
for the building suggests at least questionable financial solvency. Further-
more, in Cooks, while the landlord's operating deficit and personal
financial needs were sufficient to show a need for a protective order, they
were not sufficient to meet the burden required for a release of funds dur-
ing the lawsuit." 9 In Cooks, the court required that the landlord show an
uncontested right to a portion of the fund when seeking its release.'2 ° In
Dameron, it was sufficient for the landlord to show that a portion of the
113. Id at 585.
114. Id at 584.
115. Id at 587. The court observed that "[t]he protective order in this instance has pre-
served exactly the status existing prior to the controversy between the parties." Id Prior to
the inception of a landlord-tenant controversy, however, the tenant is in possession of the
rental unit and paying the agreed-upon rent.
116. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
117. Cooks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d at 1277.
118. See supra note 97.
119. Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d at 674 n.25.
120. Cooks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d at 1277. In Cooks, the court determined: "Where, but
only where, the court can say with complete certainty that the landlord will become entitled
to a definite part of the in-court fund in any event, and the landlord demonstrates convinc-
ingly so dire a need for that part as to persuade the court to exercise its equitable powers to
afford him some relief, the court may, to just that extent, respond favorably to the landlord's
request for disbursement from the deposited fund pendente lite." Id
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rent was arguably undisputed. 12
The landlord's situation in Dameron is analogous to the landlord's situa-
tion in Cooks, yet the court reached a radically different result. One nota-
ble difference between Cooks and Dameron, and perhaps the basis of the
Dameron decision, may be the extent of the housing code violations. The
de minimis showing of housing code violations and the character of the
apartment complex 22 in Dameron may have prompted the court to permit
a release of funds, in spite of the landlord's failure to satisfy the Cooks
criteria.
The court of appeals emphasized in Dameron that the amount retained
in the court registry is subject to the discretion of the trial judge and will
vary on a case-by-case basis. 23 Rent withholding, however, is considered
by the court to be a tactic available to tenants. 24 Apparently, the trial
court will use its discretion to determine the reasonableness of that tactic in
each case. Thus, courts sympathetic to the plight of the landlord in today's
economic situation may authorize a turnover of funds in questionable
cases, further weakening the tenants' position in landlord-tenant disputes.
In addition, it is conceivable that in the majority of landlord-tenant dis-
putes where the tenants withhold rent, the landlord will be entitled to some
rent for the premises. Under the reasoning of Dameron, the landlord
should be able to receive whatever amount the tenant is unable to demon-
strate should be retained in escrow. Even requiring the landlord to make
some showing of need should present no obstacle to the release of some
portion of the funds, since it is unlikely that a landlord will not need any
rental income from his premises.
While tenants in the District of Columbia most often withhold rent to
seek improvements in housing conditions, tenants in other jurisdictions
have used this tactic to force a landlord to sell the premises for rehabilita-
tion, to protest rent increases, to force the resignation of city commission-
121. But see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
122. The trial judge in Dameron noted that the building "could fairly be characterized as
a middle or upper-middle income apartment house. . . and that the conditions in the build-
ing were not typical of inner city low income developments or projects." 431 A.2d at 582.
123. The Dameron court stated: "The protective order is an equitable tool of the court
requiring the exercise of sound discretion on a case-by-case basis." 431 A.2d at 583. Contin-
uing, the court declared: "The amount necessary to provide this protection may vary de-
pending on the weight given by the court to appropriate factors." Id at 584. Finally, the
court stated that "[t]he true issue is the question of its amount, the determination of which is
vested in the sound discretion of the court." Id at 586.
124. The court has given tacit approval to rent withholding in both the Bell and Dam-
eron decisions. In Dameron, the court stated that "[wie see no just cause for allowing the
protective order to become an economic weapon of unreasonable proportion . Id. at
585. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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ers, and to secure changes in the welfare system. 125 Even if the decision in
Dameron is limited to situations where tenants protest a rent increase
while rent control is in effect, there is no guarantee that rent control will
not eventually be repealed. 26 Rent withholding, as a tenant bargaining
tool, is thereby limited to disputes over housing code violations. The ten-
ants' bargaining power and most effective tactic is sharply undermined by
release of funds to the landlord during litigation.
In the final analysis, while the landlord must continue to submit a mo-
tion for a protective order whenever tenants withhold rent, the burden for
maintaining any particular amount of rent in the court registry rather than
releasing a portion to the landlord may be placed on the tenant. At the
hearing on the landlord's motion for a protective order, the tenant must
demonstrate that housing code violations are of sufficient magnitude to
justify retaining the entire rent in escrow, at least where a rent increase
formed the basis of the dispute.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Dameron, the court of appeals held that release to a landlord of funds
deposited in the court registry by tenants pursuant to a protective order is
valid without a full hearing where a rent increase is in dispute and housing
code violations are de minimis. This decision potentially undermines the
125. Organization for Social and Technical Innovation, in HOUSING IN AMERICA 501-07
(D. Mandelker & R. Montgomery ed. 1973). The author remarked that "[w]hile improved
housing conditions are almost always a major objective of rent strikes, many groups have
withheld rent for other purposes. The South End Tenants' Council in Boston held a rent
strike to force a landlord to sell his properties for rehabilitation. Public housing tenants
withheld rent in St. Louis to protest rent increases, and in Muskegon Heights, Michigan, to
force the commissioners to resign. Welfare recipients in New York City talked about a rent
strike to force major changes in the welfare system, although they also wanted major hous-
ing improvements." Id at 501 (emphasis in original).
126. See generally Note, The District of Columbia Rental Housing Act of 1977 The Effect
ofRent Control on the Rental Housing Market, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 607 (1978). It is also
interesting to note that the Rental Accommodations Act of 1975, repealed nine months
before the rent increase in Dameron, provided for just such an arrangement as Capitol
House Associates sought. If tenants petitioned the Rent Adminsitrator for review of the
increase within 30 days notice of the increase, the landlord was to make monthly deposits of
that increase into an interest bearing account. The Rent Administrator determined the ulti-
mate equitable distribution of the money so deposited. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1644(h)(2)
(Supp. VI 1977). This provision was strongly recommended by the Council of the District of
Columbia. The Council members believed it imperative that landlords receive rents due
during a dispute over a rent increase. Hearing and Disposition Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Housing, and Transportation of the Comm. on the District of Columbia: First Session
on H. Con. Res. 399 to Disapprove the District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Act of
1975, reprinted in I COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MISCELLANEOUS HEARINGS,
94TH CONG., IST SESS. 47 (1975).
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effectiveness of rent withholding. Tenants in the District of Columbia may
find themselves in the disadvantaged position of having their most effec-
tive tactic neutralized in an increasingly tight rental market.' 2 7 The deci-
sion should not, however, effect the tenants' right to have the entire fund
preserved where they demonstrate major housing code violations.
Whether this potential is developed to the detriment of tenants remains
to be seen. Unquestionably, landlords will be testing the inclinations of the
trial courts. Ultimately, it is these courts that will determine the strength of
rent withholding as a tenant tactic in the District of Columbia, whenever
major housing code violations do not form the main focus of the dispute.
Susan E Patrick
127. A report prepared by the District of Columbia Department of Housing and Com-
munity Development indicates that an increased demand for rental housing, slow construc-
tion rates, low turnover of rental units, and the high number of condominium and
cooperative conversions have resulted in intense competition for the same housing among
all income groups. In addition, in 1979, 43,521 rental units were determined to require im-
provements at an estimated average cost of $10,000 each. D.C. Dep't of Housing and Com-
munity Development, Housing Problems, Conditions & Trends in the District of Columbia
(June 1979) (prepared for Mayor Marion S. Barry, Jr.). See generally Comment, From Urban
Decay to New Construction and Rehabilitation." Housing in the District of Columbia, 27 CATH.
U.L. REV. 579 (1978).
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